

Alaska Land Mobile Radio Communications System

Facility Security Penetration Procedure 200-2

Version V12

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Acronyms and Definitions

Alaska Federal Executive Association (AFEA): federal government entities, agencies, and organizations, other than the Department of Defense, that operate on the shared ALMR system infrastructure.

Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR) Communications System: the ALMR Communications System, which uses but is separate from the State of Alaska Telecommunications System (SATS), as established in the Cooperative and Mutual Aid Agreement.

Alaska Municipal League (AML): a voluntary non-profit organization in Alaska that represents local governments.

Alaska Public Safety Communication Services (APSCS): a State of Alaska (SOA) office in the Department of Public Safety (DPS) that operates and maintains the SOA Telecommunications System (SATS) supporting ALMR and provides public safety communication services and support to state agencies.

Department of Defense – Alaska: Alaskan Command, US Air Force and US Army component services operating under United States Pacific Command and United States Northern Command.

Department of Public Safety (DPS): a State of Alaska (SOA) department where the SOA Telecommunications System (SATS) and ALMR programs reside.

Executive Council: governing body made up of three voting members and two associate members representing the original four constituency groups: the State of Alaska, the Department of Defense, Federal Non-DOD agencies (represented by the Alaska Federal Executive Association), and local municipal/government (represented by the Alaska Municipal League and the Municipality of Anchorage).

Local Governments: those Alaska political subdivisions defined as municipalities in AS 29.71.800(13).

Member: a public safety agency including, but not limited to, a general government agency (local, state, or federal), its authorized employees and personnel (paid or volunteer), and its service provider, participating in and using the system under a Membership Agreement.

Municipality of Anchorage (MOA): the MOA covers 1,951 square miles with a population of over 300,000. The MOA stretches from Portage, at the southern border, to the Knik River at the northern border, and encompasses the communities of Girdwood, Indian, Anchorage, Eagle River, Chugiak/Birchwood, and the native village of Eklutna.

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Operations Manager: represents the User Council interests and makes decisions on issues related to the day-to-day operation of the system and any urgent or emergency system operational or repair decisions. In coordination with the User Council, the Operations Manager establishes policies, procedures, contracts, organizations, and agreements that provide the service levels as defined in the ALMR Service Level Agreement.

Operations Management Office (OMO): develops recommendations for policies, procedures, and guidelines; identifies technologies and standards; and coordinates intergovernmental resources to facilitate communications interoperability with emphasis on improving public safety and emergency response communications.

State of Alaska (SOA): the primary maintainer of the SATS (the State's microwave system), and shared owner of the system.

State of Alaska Telecommunications Systems (SATS): the State of Alaska statewide telecommunications system microwave network.

System: the ALMR Communications System, as established in the Cooperative and Mutual Agreement, and any and all System Design/System Analysis (SD/SA) and System Design/System Implementation (SD/SI) documents.

System Management Office (SMO): the team of specialists responsible for management of maintenance and operations of the system.

User: an agency, person, group, organization, or other entity which has an existing written Membership Agreement to operate on ALMR with one of the parties to the Cooperative and Mutual Aid Agreement. The terms user and member are synonymous and interchangeable.

User Council: governing body responsible for recommending all operational and maintenance decisions affecting the system. Under the direction and supervision of the Executive Council, the User Council has the responsibility for management oversight and operation of the system. The User Council oversees the development of system operations plans, procedures and policies under the direction and guidance of the Executive Council.



1.0 Purpose

This document serves as the guideline for conducting annual testing of the physical security measures protecting the Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR) Communications System assets at 5900 E Tudor Road and defines the roles and responsibilities for the Operations Management Office (OMO), System Management Office (SMO), and the State of Alaska (SOA) Alaska Public Safety Communications Service (APSCS).

2.0 Overview

The ALMR system has two primary zone controllers; one is located in the North Zone and one located in the South Zone. The Zone 2 (North Zone) controller is located away from the general public on Fort Wainwright where access to the installation is controlled by the Department of Defense. The Zone 1 (South Zone) controller is located at 5900 E. Tudor Road in the APSCS building. Access to the general public is controlled by SOA APSCS.

3.0 Roles and Responsibilities

3.1 Executive Council

The Executive Council (EC) shall be responsible for the management and enforcement of sanctions when violations of the Facility Security Penetration Procedure warrant such action.

3.2 User Council

The User Council (UC) shall be responsible for the formal approval of the Facility Security Penetration Procedure, and any substantial revisions hereafter.

3.3 Operations Management Office

The OMO will:

- Ensure unannounced building security penetration testing is conducted once each calendar year, at a minimum,
- Immediately notify APSCS manager if the penetration test reveals a serious threat to life, State property, or presents an environmental hazard.
- Prepare an audit report of findings and provide a copy to SOA APSCS
- Maintain a copy of the report on file.
- Work with the SMO and APSCS to update procedures and brief personnel, if unauthorized access is gained,
- Provide results to the User Council on the results annually, and

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 Challenge all unknown personnel without a valid access badge or any unescorted visitor encountered.

3.4 System Management Office

The SMO will:

- Challenge all unknown personnel without a valid access badge or any unescorted visitor,
- Ensure the zone controller room is properly secured at all times, and
- Ensure ALMR personnel are aware and trained on access requirements and procedures.

3.5 Alaska Public Safety Communications Service

APSCS will:

- Challenge all unknown personnel without a valid access badge or any unescorted visitor,
- Ensure the zone controller room is properly secured at all times, and
- Ensure APSCS personnel are aware and trained in access requirements and procedures.

3.5 Trusted Agent/OMO Staff

Any/all of the following shall be attempted by a trusted agent/staff member:

- Attempt to gain access directly through the main facility entry point, fail to obtain a visitor badge and/or fail to sign in,
- Walk the perimeter and attempt to gain access through any unsecured door,
- Attempt to roam the building unescorted and unchallenged,
- Attempt to enter the Operations Management and System Management Offices and the zone controller area unchallenged, if building access is gained,
- Attempt to leave the facility without signing out or returning the visitor badge, and,
- Complete the security penetration checklist (Appendix A) to document the results.

4.0 After Action Review

Results of the facility penetration attempt, if successful, will be provided to SOA APSCS by the Operations Manager. Procedural changes, if needed, will be discussed, agreed upon and implemented by each organization.

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Both ALMR and APSCS staff personnel will then be briefed, accordingly.

5.0 Compliance

Compliance with the Facility Security Penetration Procedure is outlined in ALMR Facility Security Penetration Policy Memorandum 200-2.

Appendix A Security Penetration Procedural Checklist

Yes	No	N/A	
			Unannounced visitor enters facility.
			Unannounced visitor is stopped upon entering the facility.
			APSCS staff inquires who the visitor is there to see.
			APSCS staff ensures that visitor signs in on the visitor log and is assigned a visitor badge to be worn visibly while on premise.
			APSCS staff calls person being visited and requests that they come and escort the visitor to their area, or escorts the visitor to the requested person/area.
			Person being visited is not in. Alternative group/person (OMO or SMO) contact is attempted.
			No internal contact can be made. Visitor is turned away.
			Visitor requests access to the zone controller room. Was access granted by the SMO or APSCS staff?
			Unescorted visitor wanders around the facility and is stopped and questioned as to his/her business.
			Unescorted visitor gains access to the zone controller room, OMO or SMO office areas (circle each one that was penetrated).
			Unescorted visitor leaves the facility without signing out and retains their visitor badge.
			OMO staff member/trusted agent walks the building perimeter and gains access through unsecured door.
NOTI	Ξ: "N/	'A" mea	ins not applicable.
Signa	ature: _		Date: