



**ALASKA LAND MOBILE RADIO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL  
(A Federal, State and Municipal Partnership)**



**MEMORANDUM FOR ALMR Executive Council**

**January 20, 2017**

**FROM: DOD Co-Chair**

**SUBJECT: January 24, 2017, Meeting Agenda**

**TO: See Distribution**

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1. **Call to Order.** Colonel Harold Hoang, Department of Defense (DOD) Co-Chair will call the meeting to order. The roll will be taken.
2. **Opening Statements and Other Announcements.**
3. **Approval of Previous Meeting Minutes.** (Colonel Hoang) Review of the draft minutes from the November Executive Council meeting. (Atch 1)

The following motion is offered to the council for consideration.

**Motion: Approve November 17, 2016, Executive Council meeting minutes, as presented.**

**4. Old Business.**

a. Strategic Transportation Improvement Plan (STIP) Application. At the November 17, 2016 meeting, Mr. Ocie Adams stated he was trying to get a line request added to the budget for the Strategic Transportation Improvement Plan (STIP) and would be requesting a substantial amount of assistance from Mr. Stormo and the OMO to gather information to complete the application.

b. Revenue Generation. During the November 17 meeting, Mr. Jim Steele noted that he would like to consider a more proactive approach to funding ALMR and compare other state funding mechanisms, cost cutting measures and revenue generating strategies. The User Council was initially suggested as the body to research and produce the documentation, but it was noted that the amount of effort was not within the scope of their responsibilities.

c. Cooperative Agreement Update. During the November meeting, Mr. Smith briefed the council that the Operations Management Office (OMO) had reviewed and edited the Cooperative Agreement because the language was grossly out of date. He requested the agreement be reviewed and approved by the council and rerouted for signatures. It was sent to Alaskan Command on November 21 for review and comment.

d. Telephone Interconnect for the Transportable Communications System. During the November meeting, Mr. Woodall recommended a memorandum of understanding be executed with the State as a solution for DOD to be able to acquire these services in emergency situations and from time to time during exercises, demonstrations or testing.

**5. User Council Update.** (Mr. Ocie Adams)

a. User Council Vacancies. (**NOTE:** This item will remain **OPEN** on the agenda until resolution.)

b. Annual Chair and Vice Chair elections.

**6. Operations Management Office.** (Mr. Del Smith)

a. Quarterly Master Site Rollover

b. FY17 Membership Agreements

c. 2016 Business Case Update

d. December 2016 System metrics (Atch 2)

e. Operations Management Office 2016 Annual Information Assurance Audit Report of Findings

f. User Council 2016 Annual Assessment on System Operations and Management Performance

g. 2016 Cumulative System totals

**7. New Business.**

System Change Request – Soldotna Gold Elite console replacement

**8. Next Meeting.** (Colonel Hoang) The next meeting is scheduled for February 16, 2017, 1:30 p.m. at the Enterprise Technology Services Conference Room, 5900 E Tudor Road.

**9. Adjourn Meeting.** (Colonel Hoang)

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Harold Hoang, Colonel, USAF  
ALCOM/ANR J6, Director C4 Systems  
ALMR Executive Council

2 Attachments:

1. Draft November Meeting Minutes
2. December System Metrics

**Distribution:**

SOA/DPS, Deputy Commissioner Bill Comer  
ALCOM/ANR J6, Colonel Harold Hoang  
FBI, A/ASAC Adam Pierce  
AML, Ms. Linda Murphy  
MOA, Captain Dave Koch  
SOA ETS, Mr. Jim Steele  
SOA ETS, Mr. Scott Stormo  
ALCOM/J64, Mr. Timothy Woodall  
MOA, Mr. Trygve Erickson  
SOA DOT, Mr. Ocie Adams  
OMO, Mr. Del Smith



**ALASKA LAND MOBILE RADIO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL  
(A Federal, State and Municipal Partnership)**



**MEMORANDUM FOR ALMR Executive Council**

**January XX, 2017**

**FROM: DOD Executive Co-Chair**

**SUBJECT: November 17, 2016, ALMR Executive Council Meeting Minutes**

**TO: See Distribution**

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**Executive Council Members Present:**

Deputy Commissioner Bill Comer

State of Alaska – Department of  
Public Safety

Colonel Harold Hoang

Department of Defense (DOD) –  
Alaskan Command (ALCOM)/J6

Captain Dave Koch

Municipality of Anchorage – Anchorage  
Police Department

A/ASAC Kevin Ellsworth

Federal Bureau of Investigation (on  
behalf of A/ASAC Kurt Ormberg)

**ALMR Support Team Members and Guests Present:**

Mr. Ocie Adams

User Council Chair (via teleconference)

Mr. Del Smith

Operations Manager

Mr. Jim Steele

Enterprise Technology Services (via  
teleconference)

Mr. Scott Stormo

Enterprise Technology Services

Mr. Tim Woodall

DOD ALMR Program Manager

Mr. John Rockwell

Department of Public Safety

Mr. Bruce Richter

OEC Region X (via teleconference)

Mr. Alan Jackson

Motorola® Solutions

Mr. Mike Hawkins

Motorola® Solutions

Ms. Sherry Shafer

Operations Management Office (via  
teleconference)

1. **Call to Order.** Deputy Commissioner Bill Comer, State of Alaska (SOA) Co-Chair, called the meeting to order at 1:35 p.m. and the roll call was read.

2. **Opening Statements and Other Announcements.**

Deputy Commissioner Comer asked the group if there were any opening statements or special announcements.

Mr. Tim Woodall introduced Mr. Alan Jackson, Motorola Solutions® Federal side, to the group and briefed them on Mr. Jackson's service with ALMR since 1997. Mr. Woodall pointed out that Mr. Jackson had been instrumental in getting the Federal and State sides of Motorola® together, but was now retiring after almost 20 years working with ALMR.

Mr. Woodall then introduced Mr. Mike Hawkins, who would be replacing Mr. Jackson. He noted Mr. Hawkins was currently in Honolulu, Hawaii, but would be coming up to Alaska in the January/February timeframe.

Mr. Jackson advised the council and staff he'd been with Motorola® a total of 36 years and ALMR had been quite an accomplishment.

Mr. Hawkins stated he was excited to begin working with everyone.

3. **Approval of Previous Meeting Minutes.** Deputy Commissioner Comer asked the Executive Council (EC) members if they had reviewed the November meeting minutes and if they had any changes. Hearing no requests for changes, he requested a motion for their approval.

**Motion: Approve the November 17 Executive Council meeting minutes as written.**

The motion was made by Colonel Harold Hoang and seconded by Deputy Commissioner Comer. There were no objections. **The motion was carried and approved.**

4. **Old Business.**

House Bill 256, Request for Information (RFI). Mr. Jim Steele advised the council the RFI closed on November 4. He stated they had received responses from Motorola, Harris, Pantel, GCI, CDX Wireless and CDP Technologies. Mr. Steele pointed out that Cisco, who basically was the cause of this RFI coming about, did not respond directly but brought in CDX who offers consulting services for planning, procuring and operating. He emphasized they did not address the essence of a complete System lifecycle operation.

Deputy Commissioner Comer asked Mr. Steele what CDX provide by way of their proposal and Mr. Steele sated that CDX wanted to provide information to make use of the State wide area network IP, which was not a ground-breaking idea and something the State already does.

Mr. Steele briefed there wasn't really any one organization with a real total cost of ownership response and they would now have to decide how to respond to the Legislature, which must occur by the end of the calendar year. He noted that he would like to consider a more proactive approach to funding ALMR and would look at other state's funding mechanisms, cost cutting measures and revenue generating strategies.

Deputy Commissioner Comer and Mr. Woodall both asked what Motorola had provided.

Mr. Steele stated it was a pretty short response which listed a description of their costs for lifecycle sustainment, other like solutions, cost estimates and product literature. He also noted Harris' submission was pretty similar.

Deputy Commissioner Comer direct this item be **CLOSED**.

## **5. User Council Update.**

a. User Council Vacancies. Mr. Ocie Adams advised the council that vacancies remained for the alternate Southeast-Municipalities position, the primary Federal Non-DOD US Forest Service position and both the primary and alternate US Army-Alaska (USARAK) positions.

Mr. Woodall stated although the paperwork had not been processed, Mr. Rick Williams had been attending the User Council meetings and would be the designated primary representative for USARAK.

b. Annual User Council Elections. Mr. Adams stated the User Council was currently conducting the annual election of the Chair and Vice Chair. He noted the ballots were due by December 2 and the results would be announced at the December 7 User Council meeting.

Deputy Commissioner Comer asked if there were any other issues pending and Mr. Adams stated there were none. He briefed that he follows the site maintenance issues and hadn't seen any trends suggesting the possibility of a catastrophic equipment failure.

Deputy Commissioner Comer asked if the User Council ever discussed the possibility of revenue generation to help cover System costs like Mr. Steele had previously mentioned.

Mr. Adams noted they had in the past and adding a specific tax had been suggested. He also noted he was trying to get a line request added to the budget for the Strategic Transportation Improvement Plan (STIP). Mr. Adams explained that depending on the score awarded to the application, in which ALMR is considered as an IT project, there could be approximately \$46M awarded to cover costs for the System through 2022. He did stress that in the last cycle 16 projects that had been submitted had not been approved and had been carried over to this cycle, so the competition was very tough. Mr. Adams stated he would be requesting a substantial amount of assistance from Mr. Stormo and the OMO to gather information to complete the application.

## **6. Operations Management Office.**

a. FY18 OMO/SMO Budget. Mr. Smith stated the budget had been approved by the Executive Council, with the final vote received on November 3, and then it had been passed on to ETS.

b. October System Metrics. Mr. Smith briefed the push to talks were approximately 1.2M for the month and busies had dropped from 530 in October down to 366.

c. FY17 Membership Agreements. Mr. Smith advised that 81 of the current 126 member agencies had completed their agreements and returned them. He also noted Haines Borough Police Department had recently joined ALMR and the Division of Forestry was going to loan them some radios until they could get their grant application done.

d. System Change Request. Mr. Smith stated he had a System Change Request for the State of Alaska replacement of 12 of the Gold Elite consoles with MCC7500s, which needed to be approved/signed by the Executive Council.

Mr. Stormo noted that Soldotna was the proposed first installation location. He also mentioned MATCOM was discussing their console replacements, but had not executed a contract yet.

e. Cooperative Agreement Update. Mr. Smith briefed the council that the Operations Management Office (OMO) had reviewed the Cooperative Agreement a couple years ago and noted the language was grossly out of date because it still contained numerous references to the Project Team. He stated the OMO had edited it to remove that language and to update references to actions that were to be completed within a certain timeframe after the agreement was signed. Mr. Smith requested the agreement be reviewed and approved by the council and rerouted for signatures.

Colonel Hoang noted that last year the opportunity was missed to discuss the cooperative in Juneau but Lieutenant General Wilsbach was going to be speaking in front of the Legislature sometime in February 2017. He pointed out the timing of the update was good if we could get this completed.

Mr. Woodall stated their Base Legal Office would want to update the clauses, as well.

## **7. New Business.**

a. Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) Day. Colonel Hoang advised the group that ALCOM was hosting a DSCA day in late January, but the actual timing would be based on the General's schedule. He stated that there would also be demonstrations of the capabilities similar to when the Executive Council visited in October.

Mr. Smith briefed a couple officers from the U.S. Army 4/25 had recently come over to talk to him about what capabilities their radios offered, as they were being assigned a DSCA role in December.

b. Revenue Generation. NOTE: This item was mentioned during previous discussions regarding the RFI, but further discussion was deferred until New Business.

Deputy Commissioner Comer advised he was not sure how to approach this.

Mr. Smith stated he wished the SIGB was stood up because they should be making any kinds of recommendations to the Governor regarding surcharges or fees on any number of things. He pointed out if you have something every citizen pays, then the locals are contributing toward the System funding.

Mr. Woodall stated he agreed with Mr. Smith. He noted that the Department of Homeland Security has a governance model covering this and through that process they might be able to deliver something to the Governor for consideration.

Mr. Woodall advised the DOD would have to be silent in any conversations like this, but would be supportive of alternate funding recommendations.

Mr. John Rockwell stated the thought it was the User Council's responsibility to form a committee and come up with a strong recommendation regarding a total cost of ownership strategy.

Mr. Woodall pointed out the User Council doesn't have the personnel to form a committee and report monthly or the money to develop a model or study. He suggested the best they could do was perhaps develop a white paper on recommendations.

c. QA/QC Test of the Transportable Communications System. Mr. Woodall reminded the council one of the missions of Alaskan Command is DSCA and part of the response actions is to facilitate and offer email, phone, and internet services in the event of a disaster. He stated that during their most recent test of Transportable Area North, they were unable to connect to the SOA telephone system like they had previously been able to do and he wondered what had occurred that would have changed their access. Subsequent discussion on the subject pointed to the contract for the SOA phone system being acquired by GCI.

Mr. Woodall recommended a memorandum of understanding be executed with the State as a solution for DOD to be able to acquire these services in emergency situations and from time to time during exercises, demonstrations or testing. He noted they were trying to come up with a clear process at this point, so they could have something in place.

Mr. Stormo stated Enterprise Technology Services could help look at this and requested Mr. Woodall send him an email request.

Mr. Steele also stated they should be able to figure it out.

**8. Next Meeting.** Deputy Commissioner Comer briefed the next meeting is scheduled for December 15, at 1:30 p.m. at 5900 E Tudor Road in the Enterprise Technology

Services Conference Room. He noted he would be unavailable starting December 15 through the remainder of the month.

There was discussion regarding the cancellation of the December meeting due to the absence of so many personnel during the holidays, and it was agreed upon that the next regular meeting would be held on January 19, 2017.

**9. Adjourn Meeting.** Deputy Commissioner Comer asked if there were any other items for the council's discussion.

Hearing no comments, Deputy Commissioner Comer requested a motion to adjourn the meeting.

**Motion: Adjourn the November monthly Executive Council meeting.**

The motion was made by Colonel Hoang and seconded by Deputy Commissioner Comer. There were no objections. **The motion was carried and approved.**

The meeting adjourned at 2:51 p.m.


Bill Comer, Deputy Commissioner  
State of Alaska, Department of Public Safety  
ALMR Executive Council

**Distribution:**


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SOA ETS, Mr. Scott Stormo  
ALCOM/J64, Mr. Timothy Woodall  
MOA, Mr. Trygve Erickson  
OMO, Mr. Del Smith

# 2016 System Performance


## Active Voice Calls



# 2016 System Performance Data Channel Allocations



# 2016 System Performance Busy Voice Calls





# **Alaska Land Mobile Radio Communications System**

## **Operations Management Office 2016 Annual Information Assurance Audit Report of Findings**

January 9, 2017

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The Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR) Communications System Operations Management Office (OMO) is tasked with day-to-day oversight of the operational System. As part of their responsibilities, they randomly audit the administration and controls of certain tasks required under the Information Assurance (IA) Program.

There are five areas of audit/inspection the OMO oversees:

- Physical Security – managed by State of Alaska (SOA) Enterprise Technology Services (ETS)
- System Management Media Backup Storage – managed by the System Management Office (SMO) and the ALMR Security Manager (SCM)
- System Log In Report – managed by the SMO and SCM
- Information Assurance Control Review – managed by the SCM
- System Vulnerability Assessment – managed by the SMO and SCM

## **1.0 Physical Security**

Physical security areas encompass the OMO, SMO, zone controller space and the routes to access any of these areas.

Physical security audits consist of unannounced penetration attempts by any visitor to bypass existing security policy/measures and gain access to a location with an opportunity to potentially cause harm to persons or property within the below described areas. The audit complies with established ALMR Facility Security Penetration Policy 200-2.

The OMO will conduct unannounced security penetration auditing at a minimum of once each calendar year at the SOA ETS facility located at 5900 E. Tudor Road, Anchorage, Alaska. Penetration attempts will focus on the ALMR OMO, SMO, and the Zone Controller areas of the facility, and the access routes to them.

**Date of Audit:** April 18

**Procedures:** Operations Management Office (OMO) Technical Advisor Richard G. Leber walked the perimeter of the ETS facility and tested all entry points seeking unannounced entry into the facility.

**Observations:** The South garage bay door was wide open with no one in sight.

**Follow-up Actions:** Follow-up inspections will be performed within the next few months with results reported.

**Date of Audit:** June 13

**Procedures:** Operations Management Office (OMO) Technical Advisor Richard G. Leber walked the perimeter of the ETS facility and tested all entry points seeking unannounced entry into the facility.

**Observations:** All exterior doors secured and locked.

**Follow-up Actions:** None

## **2.0 System Management Media Backup Storage**

Backups enable the rapid recovery of the ALMR System in the event of a disaster, either man-made or natural. Established controls and procedures minimize the impact to System users and ensure an expeditious return to operations. Backup media must be stored and protected in a manner which minimizes the risk of loss, damage, or destruction.

In accordance with ALMR policy, all backup media will be clearly labeled to ensure the media content can be quickly recognized. Back-up copies (or the original media) of the operating system and other critical software shall be stored in a fire-rated container and not located on site with the operational software. This material will be stored within a secure area that is restricted to authorized individuals only. Additionally, all backup media created from daily/weekly backup procedures will be stored in an offsite location.

All backup media for the South Zone Controller is stored at Department of Public Safety (DPS), 5700 E. Tudor Road, in Anchorage and for the North Zone Controller at the Fairbanks Police Department, 911 E. Cushman Street, in Fairbanks.

The OMO conducts unannounced, random monthly audits of the backup media storage facility. Due to travel funding issues, audits of the North Zone Controller backup storage are only conducted when OMO staff is in the Fairbanks area for other activities.

2.1 Monthly Backup. Results of the monthly audits for the System software/media backups are as follows:

- **Date of Audit:** January 25  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** January 21  
**Log Entry:** January 25  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None
- **Date of Audit:** February 17  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** February 11  
**Log Entry:** February 17  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe

was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.

**Corrective Action:** None

- **Date of Audit:** February 19  
**Location:** 911 E. Cushman St., Fairbanks  
**System Configuration Software Present:** Yes  
**Media Clearly Labeled:** Yes  
**Findings:** Arrangements were made in advance for access to the Fairbanks Police Department area where the storage container is located. The container was in an acceptable/secured location and locked.  
**Corrective Action:** None
- **Date of Audit:** March 21  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** March 10  
**Log Entry:** March 14  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None
- **Date of Audit:** April 19  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** April 14  
**Log Entry:** April 18  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None
- **Date of Audit:** May 26  
**Location:** 911 E. Cushman St., Fairbanks  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** Yes  
**Log Entry:** Yes  
**Findings:** Arrangements were made in advance for access to the Fairbanks Police Department area where the storage container is located. The container was in an acceptable/secured location and locked.  
**Corrective Action:** None

- **Date of Audit:** May 31  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** May 19  
**Log Entry:** May 23  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None.
  
- **Date of Audit:** June 21  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** June 16  
**Log Entry:** June 21  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None.
  
- **Date of Audit:** July 12  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** July 7  
**Log Entry:** July 12  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None.
  
- **Date of Audit:** August 22  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** August 4  
**Log Entry:** August 11  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None.

- **Date of Audit:** September 27  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** September 15  
**Log Entry:** September 21  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None.
- **Date of Audit:** October 26  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** September 22  
**Log Entry:** October 4  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None.
- **Date of Audit:** November 29  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** November 22  
**Log Entry:** November 25  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None.
- **Date of Audit:** December 28  
**Location:** 5700 E. Tudor Road  
**Weekly KMF backup CD:** December 8  
**Log Entry:** December 12  
**Findings:** No issues were raised with access to the Alaska State Troopers (AST) building; exterior door was secure upon arrival, access card worked, and the safe was in an accessible location. The storage container is located behind a gated/locked enclosure on the lower level.  
**Corrective Action:** None.

2.2 Annual Test. Per the System Backup and Recovery Procedure 400-5, paragraph 8, the procedures for the ALMR System backup and recovery shall be tested annually by the SMO, and all results of the test shall be recorded and provided to the Operations Manager.

**NOTE:** Real-world occurrences of, and SMO responses to, System failures shall meet the annual test requirement.

- **Date of Incident:** May 29, 2016, 1737 hours – Cottonwood Creek Site – Lightning Strike on Rx Antenna – Site in Comm Failure. (Motorola Case 24886077, ALMR WO 44670)

**Details:** On May 29, 2016, at approximately 1737 hours, the Cottonwood Creek Site in Wasilla was struck by lightning when an electrical storm passed through. This strike hit the Rx antenna, blew the receive cable off the bottom of the antenna arced over to the tower, and traveled down to the ground. At that point, it appears that the lightning arced over to the power line feeding the site facility and blew the transformer off the power pole, hit the power box feeding the facility and destroyed the fiber panel inside causing a small fire to break out within the facility, melting the plastic cover to the light and plastics on network cables. It appears that the bonding and grounding worked as designed by ETS. When technicians arrived on site within approximately 15 minutes, the fire was out and equipment was still running on battery. All the equipment was shut down and visual assessments were taken by facility and equipment owners (ETS, ARR, MTA and ALMR).

Impact of the lightning strike was a complete loss of the Cottonwood Creek site, and due to Cottonwood Creek site being a hub in Zone 1, it caused the loss of connectivity to five RF sites (Goose Creek, Divide, Tsina, Ernestine, and Willow Mountain), and two dispatch centers (MATCOM and Goose Creek Correctional Center). With immediate on the spot ETS technicians working the networking issue, four of the five RF sites were brought back into service with circuit rerouting. A few hours later MATCOM and Goose Creek dispatch centers and Goose Creek RF site were operational, as well, with leased circuits from MTA.

**Findings:** It was discovered Sunday during the electrical install that the lightning had arced to the State of Alaska Railroad system that was also installed in the facility where the ALMR equipment resides. Upon further investigation, the ARR equipment was found to be inadequately grounded at the site where the lightning strike traveled within the electrical feed through the building and caused the fire in the fiber panel.

**Results:** Initial catastrophic event planning began on Sunday evening, May 29, at approximate 1800 hours. The initial planning meeting took place first thing on Tuesday morning after the Memorial Day weekend. Plans were made to remove all equipment by the end of the day, so that a restoration company could begin Wednesday, June 1, and clean, repair and paint the facility; all that would be completed by Friday, June 3. Beginning on Wednesday, June 1, ETS would inspect, sweep and repair all microwave dishes, antennas and cabling on the tower.

The ETS plan was to restore power to facility and begin installing site equipment through the weekend, June 4-5. On Saturday, the ETS technicians completed the tower work, Sunday the electrical was installed back to the site facility, and Monday microwave network and ALMR installation began.

On June 8, at 1405L the response teams from all agencies completely replaced the Cottonwood Creek Site and made it fully operational. Total site downtime was 9 days, 20 hours and 28 minutes.

**NOTE:** The results are also listed in the annual System Recovery Assessment and Backup-Recovery Report dated December 2, 2016.

### **3.0 System Log In Report**

To ensure the SMO observes and reports on the established control for the Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) Authority to Operate, the OMO performs unannounced, random monthly audit inspections of the System Login Report though out the calendar year.

Each user is permitted to attempt to log in three times prior to being locked out of the System. System user passwords are changed, at a minimum, every 90 days.

- **Dates of Audit:** January 25  
**Inspection Period:** January 17 - 23  
**Findings:** There were no instances of three failed login attempts during the period.  
**Corrective Action:** None
  
- **Dates of Audit:** February 16  
**Inspection Period:** February 7 - 13  
**Findings:** There were three instances of three failed login attempts during the period.
  - February 10: Zone 1, 5:18:55 p.m., astrousr had less than three attempts, times two
  - February 10: Zone 1, 5:47:38 p.m., 10.1.20.3 OP3 password reset request.
  - February 16: Zone 2, 11:18:09 a.m., astrait had less than three attempts, times two.**Corrective Action:** None; there were no issues resulting from the login in attempts by astrousr and astrait. Password reset by Soldotna AST.
  
- **Dates of Audit:** March 21  
**Inspection Period:** March 13 - 19  
**Findings:** There was one instance of three failed login attempts during the period.
  - March 17: Zone 2, 6:21:35 p.m., astrousr had less than three attempts, times two.**Corrective Action:** None; there were no issues resulting from the login attempts.

- **Dates of Audit:** April 18  
**Inspections Period:** April 10 – 16  
**Findings:** There was one instance of three failed login attempts during the period.
  - April 14: Zone 1, 1:56:09 p.m., astrait attempted to login four times, with three failed attempts.**Corrective Action:** Contacted individual and reset password.
  
- **Dates of Audit:** May 31  
**Inspection Period:** May 22 - 28  
**Findings:** There were no instances of three failed login attempts during the period.  
**Corrective Action:** None.
  
- **Date of Audit:** June 20  
**Inspection Period:** June 12 - 18  
**Findings:** There was one instance of three failed login attempts during the period.
  - June 17, Zone 2, 1:51:30p.m., astrait conducting master site maintenance.**Corrective Action:** None.
  
- **Date of Audit:** July 12  
**Inspection Period:** July 3 - 9  
**Findings:** There were no instances of three failed login attempts during the period.  
**Corrective Action:** None.
  
- **Date of Audit:** August 22  
**Inspection Period:** August 14 - 20  
**Findings:** There were no instances of three failed login attempts during the period.  
**Corrective Action:** None.
  
- **Date of Audit:** September 26  
**Inspection Period:** September 18 - 24  
**Findings:** There were three (3) instances of failed login attempts during the period.
  - Zone 1, Mark Jenks patching system devices and generated two pass failures.
  - Zone 2, Matt Oliver attempted to reconnect to Donnelly Dome RF Site switch 2, Port 24 (maintenance port) after it was secured generating a Motorola SOC case. Motorola SOC case: 25061735**Corrective Action:** None.
  
- **Date of Audit:** October 26  
**Inspection Period:** October 16 - 22  
**Findings:** There were no instances of three failed login attempts during the period.  
**Corrective Action:** None.
  
- **Date of Audit:** November 29  
**Inspection Period:** November 20 - 26

**Findings:** There were no instances of three failed login attempts during the period.  
**Corrective Action:** None.

- **Date of Audit:** December 28  
**Inspection Period:** December 18 - 24  
**Findings:** There were no instances of three failed login attempts during the period.  
**Corrective Action:** None.

#### **4.0 Information Assurance Control Reviews**

In accordance with the Information Assurance (IA) Control Review Procedure 200-6, a Department of Defense (DOD) Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIARMP) Annual Review Report shall be created which documents the findings of an assessment of a subset of implemented security controls reflective of the security categorization of the System and any threats to the System.

At the conclusion of IA Control Review activities, the IA Control Review team will provide an informal briefing of the results of the IA Control Review to the Operations Manager and the System Manager.

- **Date of Briefing:**  
**Findings:**  
**Follow-up Actions:**

#### **5.0 System Vulnerability Assessment**

In accordance with the System Vulnerability Management Procedure 400-6, a network Vulnerability Assessment shall be performed by the Security Manager at least quarterly. Assessment results must provide Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) compliant assessments.

- **Date of Audit:** April 4 (covers the period of January – March)  
**Finding 1:** There is no fire suppression system installed within the Tudor Road facility.  
**NOTE:** Initial request taken from 14 May 2008 POAM - Contract CRS0425.  
**Recommendation:** SOA waived as an acceptable risk due to cost. Item will remain in report for historical purposes.  
  
**Finding 2:** There is no humidity control system installed at the Tudor Road facility.  
**NOTE:** Initial request taken from 14 May 2008 POAM - Contract CRS0475.  
**Recommendation:** SOA waived as an acceptable risk due to cost. Item will remain in report for historical purposes.
- **Date of Audit:** July 7 (covers the period of April – June)

**Finding 1:** There is no fire suppression system installed within the Tudor Road facility.

**NOTE:** Initial request taken from 14 May 2008, POAM - Contract CRS0425.

**Recommendation:** SOA waived as an acceptable risk due to cost. Item will remain in report for historical purposes.

**Finding 2:** There is no humidity control system installed at the Tudor Road facility.

**NOTE:** Initial request taken from 14 May 2008 POAM - Contract CRS0475.

**Recommendation:** SOA waived as an acceptable risk due to cost. Item will remain in report for historical purposes.

- **Date of Audit:** October 5 (covers the period July – September)

**Finding 1:** There is no fire suppression system installed within the Tudor Road facility.

**NOTE:** Initial request taken from 14 May 2008, POAM - Contract CRS0425.

**Recommendation:** SOA waived as an acceptable risk due to cost. Item will remain in report for historical purposes.

**Finding 2:** There is no humidity control system installed at the Tudor Road facility.

**NOTE:** Initial request taken from 14 May 2008 POAM - Contract CRS0475.

**Recommendation:** SOA waived as an acceptable risk due to cost. Item will remain in report for historical purposes.

- **Date of Audit:** January 3, 2017 (covers October – December 2016)

**Finding 1:** There is no fire suppression system installed within the Tudor Road facility.

**NOTE:** Initial request taken from 14 May 2008, POAM - Contract CRS0425.

**Recommendation:** SOA waived as an acceptable risk due to cost. Item will remain in report for historical purposes.

**Finding 2:** There is no humidity control system installed at the Tudor Road facility.

**NOTE:** Initial request taken from 14 May 2008 POAM - Contract CRS0475.

**Recommendation:** SOA waived as an acceptable risk due to cost. Item will remain in report for historical purposes.

## 6.0 Conclusion

Based on each of the audit areas and corrective actions taken, the following determinations are made:

**Finding 1:** SOA ETS failed to enforce the established methods/controls of the Physical Security Program for building security in April. However, during the follow-up inspection in June, everything was secure.

**Finding 2:** SOA ETS, in coordination with the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, should plan and budget for the installation of a fire suppression system and a



humidity control system within the Tudor Road facility. Loss of the Tudor Master site would be catastrophic for ALMR.